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INTRODUCTION 
David Ourlicht, a black Manhattan man in his twenties, was stopped and 
frisked by New York City police officers three separate times in 2008.1 That 
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1 Floyd v. City of New York (Floyd I), 283 F.R.D. 153, 169-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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same year, Ourlicht and three other black men who had similarly been stopped 
and frisked filed a federal lawsuit against the City of New York, alleging that 
the New York City Police Department’s stop-and-frisk program violated their 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.2 The plaintiffs brought a class 
action suit in the Southern District of New York on behalf of themselves and 
all others similarly situated, and they sought an injunction mandating an 
overhaul of the City’s stop-and-frisk program.3 The case, Floyd v. City of New 
York, was heard by Judge Shira Scheindlin, who, in 2013, found that the City’s 
stop-and-frisk program was unconstitutional4 and ordered sweeping changes 
to the program.5 The plaintiffs got results: in 2011, NYPD officers stopped 
686,000 individuals, or on average more than 13,000 per week;6 by the end of 
2013, such stops had fallen by more than 90% to fewer than 2000 per week.7 
But an even more consequential decision in the case may have been an 
earlier, overlooked one: in 2012, the Floyd court found that the plaintiffs had 
standing to seek an injunction.8 More specifically, the court found that David 
Ourlicht had standing, and since he was a class representative, his standing 
satisfied Article III’s case or controversy requirement.9 In so holding, however, 
the court appeared to run afoul of two Supreme Court precedents: one that 
requires a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief to “establish a real and immediate 
threat that he [will] again” suffer the alleged harm,10 and another that holds 
“[t]hat a suit may be a class action . . . adds nothing to the question of 
standing.”11 Was there actually a real and immediate threat that David Ourlicht 
would again be stopped and frisked by NYPD officers? That seems doubtful. 
And yet the district court’s finding that the plaintiffs had standing was 
correct, under both class action theory and Supreme Court precedent. This 
Comment articulates the reasons why it was correct. Part I begins by giving 
a brief overview of standing generally. Part II shows how theory and precedent 
justify a relaxed approach to standing in class actions. Finally, Part III explains 
the Floyd court’s standing analysis and shows that, below the surface, the court 
was actually using a justifiably relaxed approach. 
 
2 Id. at 159. 
3 Id. 
4 Floyd v. City of New York (Floyd II), 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 658-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
5 Floyd v. City of New York (Floyd III), 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
6 Floyd II, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 558. 
7 Mike Bostock & Ford Fessenden, ‘Stop-and-Frisk’ Is All but Gone from New York, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/09/19/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-is-all-but-
gone-from-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/6AM8-YLCD]. 
8 Floyd I, 283 F.R.D. at 169. 
9 Id. 
10 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983). Importantly, the Floyd court’s standing 
analysis expressly relied on Lyons. Floyd I, 283 F.R.D. at 169-70. 
11 Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976). 
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF STANDING 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution gives federal courts the power to hear 
certain cases and controversies.12 Standing is a doctrine, read into Article III 
and expanded beyond it, that developed out of “some basic sense that not 
everyone who wanted to go to court could do so.”13 One of the Supreme 
Court’s classic formulations of the standing question asks whether the plaintiff 
has “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure 
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon 
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult . . . questions.”14 
Plainly, answering such a question is hardly like answering a simple question 
such as “Is it raining?” and the vagueness of the standing inquiry—in that 
formulation and more generally—gives judges a lot of room to maneuver. Like 
the other “doctrines that cluster about Article III,” standing relates “to an 
idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, 
about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected, 
unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government.”15 In other words, 
standing analysis in practice is often an unguided and results-oriented mess. 
As alluded to, standing has both constitutional and nonconstitutional aspects. 
Under current constitutional doctrine, standing has three elements that each 
federal plaintiff must satisfy: (1) injury in fact—“an invasion of a legally protected 
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent”; 
(2) causation—the injury must be traceable to the defendant’s actions; and (3) 
redressability—it must be “‘likely’ . . . that the “injury will be ‘redressed by a 
favorable decision.’”16 On top of these Article III limits, the Supreme Court 
has also imposed nonconstitutional, policy-based restrictions on standing. 
This body of doctrine, known as “prudential” standing,17 includes restrictions 
on hearing claims based on “widely shared grievance[s]”18 and limits on a 
party’s ability to litigate the rights of others.19 Prudential standing’s significance 
as a nonconstitutional doctrine is that, unlike with Article III standing, Congress 
 
12 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
13 LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 322 (3d ed. 2009). 
14 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). 
15 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 
1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring)), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. 
Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387-88 (2014). 
16 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (citations omitted). 
17 YACKLE, supra note 13, at 318. 
18 See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998) (holding that, in these cases, “the Court has sometimes 
determined that where large numbers of Americans suffer alike, the political process, rather than 
the judicial process, may provide the more appropriate remedy”). 
19 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193 (1976) (describing such “restrictions on third-party 
standing” as “designed to minimize unwarranted intervention into controversies”). 
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can have the final word: “Congress may grant an express right of action to persons 
who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules.”20 
Because both Floyd and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the Supreme Court 
case on which the Floyd court relied in its standing analysis, dealt with Article 
III standing, the rest of Part I attempts to untangle the history of—and problems 
with—the two prongs of Article III standing that are relevant here: injury in 
fact and redressability.21 
A. Injury in Fact 
In its 1970 decision in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. 
Camp, the Supreme Court first established “injury in fact” as a constitutional 
requirement of standing.22 In doing so, the Court altered standing’s pre-Data 
Processing injury requirement23 by untethering it from a need to show a violation 
of any particular law.24 “Altered” is intentionally inconclusive: it remains 
unclear whether injury in fact relaxed or heightened the standard compared 
to legal injury.25 In its less strict incarnations, injury in fact is satisfied as long 
as the plaintiff alleges that he suffered an “adverse effect” from the defendant’s 
conduct26—an easy bar to clear. But the vagueness of injury in fact has allowed 
the Court to draw arbitrary lines between “judicially cognizable” injuries and 
those that are “too abstract” to satisfy Article III.27 
Because it introduced this unpredictable malleability, and for other, more 
fundamental reasons, the injury in fact requirement has been subject to 
significant criticism.28 The core of this criticism was perhaps best expressed 
 
20 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). 
21 Because causation was easy for the Floyd plaintiffs to satisfy and will not be a serious hurdle 
in stop-and-frisk cases generally, it does not merit significant discussion here. 
22 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970). 
23 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
24 See Warth, 422 U.S. at 500 (“[S]tanding in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff ’s 
contention that particular conduct is illegal . . . .”). 
25 See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 300 
(2008) (“Not every person who suffers an injury has suffered the violation of a personal right . . . . Nor 
does every person who suffers the violation of a personal right suffer an injury because of that violation.”). 
26 See Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 624-25 (2004) (“[A]n individual subjected to an adverse effect 
has injury enough to open the courthouse door . . . .”). 
27 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc., v. 
Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387-88 (2014). 
28 See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 229 (1988) 
(“Properly understood, standing doctrine should not require that a plaintiff have suffered ‘injury in 
fact.’”); id. at 231 (“[T]he ‘injury in fact’ requirement . . . is a singularly unhelpful, even incoherent, 
addition to the law of standing.”); Hessick, supra note 25, at 299 (“Historical practice . . . does not 
justify inserting the injury-in-fact requirement into Article III.”); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing 
After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 222 (1992) (“Data 
Processing . . . diverted attention from the relevant question of [whether there is a] cause of action 
to the irrelevant question of injury in fact.”). 
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by Judge William Fletcher, then a professor, who argued that the requirement 
“cannot be applied in a non-normative way” because there “cannot be a merely 
factual determination [disconnected from any consideration of legal rights of] 
whether a plaintiff has been injured.”29 To illustrate the incoherence of injury 
in fact, Fletcher described a man, not himself homeless, who is upset by the 
government’s cutbacks of welfare to the homeless. A court would likely say 
that the man has no standing to sue the government, because he has not suffered 
an injury in fact. But being upset is a factual injury, so what the court would 
actually be saying is that being upset is not a sufficient injury to sue under the 
relevant welfare law.30 
Justice Scalia, who long recognized that giving injury in fact its plain 
meaning results in standing for far too many plaintiffs for his tastes, had long 
sought to harness the term like the hypothetical court did in the welfare case 
above.31 In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the apex of this effort, Scalia 
constitutionalized a distinction between suits where the “plaintiff is himself 
an object of the action (or foregone action) at issue” and suits where the 
“injury arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of 
regulation) of someone else.”32 Scalia’s argument is that because injury in fact 
is a constitutional requirement that each plaintiff must show, Congress does 
not have the power to grant individuals who do not have such an injury standing 
to sue on behalf of those who do.33 Yet while Lujan’s invalidation of congressional 
grants of such “citizen suits” is still good law,34 its logic, like that of injury in 
fact doctrine’s generally, is weak and not supported by the history of Article 
III: “With respect to standing . . . the key question [should be] whether 
Congress (or some other relevant source of law) has created a cause of 
action.”35 If it has, the plaintiff has standing; if it has not, the plaintiff does not. 
 
29 Fletcher, supra note 28, at 231. 
30 Id. at 232; see also Sunstein, supra note 28, at 177 (criticizing the injury in fact requirement 
on the grounds that “people have standing if the law has granted them a right to bring suit”). 
31 See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 
17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 886 (1983) (“[T]here is a limit upon even the power of Congress to 
convert generalized benefits into legal rights . . . .”). 
32 504 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1992). 
33 See id. at 573 (criticizing the lower court for having “held that the injury-in-fact requirement 
had been satisfied by congressional conferral upon all persons of an abstract, self-contained, 
noninstrumental ‘right’ to have the Executive observe the procedures required by law”). 
34 See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (noting that Congress cannot grant standing to plaintiffs 
who can only show “abstract” harm, such as an “injury to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed”). 
35 Sunstein, supra note 28, at 222. 
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B. Redressability 
For years, the Supreme Court collapsed causation and redressability into 
a single inquiry.36 This was an analytical error, because the concepts are 
distinct; whether the defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff ’s injury is a 
fundamentally different question than whether the remedy the plaintiff seeks 
will actually address that injury.37 A good example of redressability as an 
independent requirement, and one of the Court’s first uses of it as a 
constitutional bar to a suit by a plaintiff who otherwise had standing, is Linda 
R.S. v. Richard D.38 In Linda R.S., the mother of an illegitimate child sued the 
local prosecutor to compel the prosecution of the child’s father for failure to 
pay child support.39 The Court found that because the harm the mother 
alleged was that she had not received support payments, it was unclear 
whether the harm would be addressed by the remedy she sought: “The 
prospect that prosecution will, at least in the future, result in payment of 
support can, at best, be termed only speculative.”40 
Beyond its direct holding, Linda R.S. illustrates something else: that the 
redressability inquiry is always related to how the injury is characterized.41 In 
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the Court clarified this point by erecting a barrier 
to a plaintiff’s attempt to enjoin future harm even when the plaintiff 
unquestionably has standing to seek damages for past harm.42 Lyons had been 
put in a chokehold by Los Angeles police officers during a roadside traffic stop, 
“rendering him unconscious.”43 Lyons sued both for damages for that chokehold 
and for an injunction barring future chokeholds by the Los Angeles Police 
Department.44 The Court found that because Lyons had neither shown “that 
 
36 See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978) (analyzing 
whether “injuries fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, or put otherwise, that 
the exercise of the Court’s remedial powers would redress the claimed injuries” (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted)). 
37 Unfortunately, the modern Court has not completely shed itself of this error. See Massachusetts 
v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 523 (2007) (analyzing both whether “EPA’s refusal to regulate . . . emissions 
‘contribute[d]’ to Massachusetts’ injuries” and whether there was “any realistic possibility . . . that 
the relief petitioners [sought] would . . . remedy their injuries”). 
38 410 U.S. 614 (1973). 
39 Id. at 615-16. 
40 Id. at 618. 
41 For example, had the Linda R.S. plaintiff claimed that she was harmed because the father had 
not been prosecuted, redressability would have been satisfied (but injury in fact would likely not have 
been). For more on this, see Sunstein, supra note 28, at 207 (distinguishing injuries described in 
“sharply particularistic” terms from those that are merely “characterized as an increased risk of harm”). 
42 461 U.S. 95, 131 (1983). This concept has come to be known as “remedial standing.” See 
generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the 
Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1984). 
43 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 97-98. 
44 Id. at 98. 
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all police officers in Los Angeles always choke any citizen with whom they 
happen to have an encounter” nor “that the City ordered or authorized police 
officers to act in such manner,” he had not “establish[ed] a real and immediate 
threat that he would again be stopped” and put in a chokehold.45 Thus, after 
Lyons, a plaintiff seeking an injunction has to show—as an Article III prerequisite—
a “real and immediate threat” of future harm.46 
Lyons came under fire for being a constitutional (rather than a prudential) 
decision47 and, relatedly, for ignoring the “substantive policies underlying 
Congress’s decision to authorize equitable relief under” § 1983,48 the law 
under which Lyons had sued.49 Although it predated Lujan’s official decree 
that Congress cannot statutorily create standing where any one of injury in 
fact, causation, or redressability is lacking, Lyons, by “characterizing its remedial 
standing inquiry as mandated by [A]rticle III[,] . . . implied that Congress 
could not authorize injunctive relief based solely on past injuries.”50 This 
implication in Lyons (and mandate in Lujan) is particularly important in 
§ 1983 suits, because “[s]everal lines of authority support Congress’s power to 
adjust doctrines of justiciability to allow private parties to enforce constitutional 
rights.”51 As in its injury in fact cases,52 then, the Court has given Article III’s 
standing requirements—or, rather, Data Processing’s interpretation of Article 
III’s requirements53—enough might to place serious and unjustified limits on 
Congress’s lawmaking power. 
A final example, drawn from the mootness context, shows why Lyons is on 
shaky ground as a constitutional holding and is inconsistent with the Court’s 
own decisions. With mootness, which is often simply referred to as standing 
 
45 Id. at 105-06. 
46 Justice Marshall’s dissent in Lyons attacked the majority on this very point: “Under the view 
expressed by the majority today, if the police adopt a policy of ‘shoot to kill,’ or a policy of shooting 
1 out of 10 suspects, the federal courts will be powerless to enjoin its continuation.” Id. at 137 
(Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Linda E. Fisher, Caging Lyons: The Availability of Injunctive Relief 
in Section 1983 Actions, 18 LOY. U. L.J. 1085, 1098 (1987) (“A standard requiring virtual certainty [of 
future injury] is anomalous relative to the body of caselaw regarding standing.”). 
47 See YACKLE, supra note 13, at 360 (“[I]t’s hard to see why Justice White didn’t rest on the 
equitable criteria for injunctive relief alone rather than making the decision turn on the constitutional 
law of standing.”). 
48 Fallon, supra note 42, at 8; see also id. at 26 (“Lyons apparently erects a heightened barrier to 
the protection of federal rights in suits for injunctive relief.”). 
49 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (“Every person who . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
50 Fallon, supra note 42, at 30; see also id. (“Lyons’s remedial standing analysis also may 
jeopardize the protective powers of Congress.”). 
51 Id. at 34. 
52 See supra Section I.A. 
53 See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text. 
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over time,54 one thorny area the Court has dealt with is where the relevant 
injury is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”55 This type of case generally 
involves a past injury that will reoccur but will not last long enough for 
judicial review to be feasible.56 Here, the Court has relaxed Article III in light 
of the public policy interest in having these cases heard and has usually held 
that such cases are not moot as long as there is a “‘reasonable expectation’ or 
a ‘demonstrated probability’” of the injury’s recurrence.57 In light of this 
apparently permissible flexibility, Lyons’s rule that Congress cannot authorize 
suits for injunctive relief where the risk of future injury is anything less than 
“real and immediate” is even more bewildering. 
II. STANDING IN CLASS ACTIONS: THEORY AND PRECEDENT 
 FOR A RELAXED APPROACH  
The four prerequisites for any class action are that 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the 
claims or defenses of the class; and 
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests 
of the class.58 
In addition to these threshold requirements, Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23 provides that a class action may be maintained if “the party 
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally 
to the class, so that final injunctive relief . . . is appropriate respecting the 
class as a whole.”59 
Although the Court has acknowledged that “the Rule 23 class-action device 
was designed to allow an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted 
by and on behalf of the individual named parties only,”60 it has long emphasized 
 
54 See Fallon, supra note 42, at 24-25 (“Mootness is the justiciability doctrine concerned specifically 
with the relevance or irrelevance of an injury’s temporal passage.”). 
55 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (illustrating the idea but finding no mootness 
problem even where the plaintiff, who was challenging abortion restrictions, was no longer pregnant 
when the Court heard the case). 
56 YACKLE, supra note 13, at 408. 
57 E.g., Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) (per curiam) (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 
423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per curiam)). And in Roe, 410 U.S. at 125, the Court went so far as to not 
discuss any “requisite likelihood [of recurrence] at all.” Fallon, supra note 42, at 27; see also YACKLE, 
supra note 13, at 409 (“The Court’s decisions regarding mootness . . . are plainly more generous to 
litigants than are the Court’s parallel decisions on standing.”). 
58 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
59 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
60 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979). 
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the fact “[t]hat a suit may be a class action . . . adds nothing to the question 
of standing.”61 As a surface matter, then, a plaintiff suing for an injunction on 
behalf of both himself and a multimillion-person class—such as one of Floyd’s 
named plaintiffs—must still individually satisfy Lyons by showing a “real and 
immediate” threat of future harm to himself.62 This Part shows that, in such 
cases, class action theory justifies a more relaxed approach to standing, and 
precedent illustrates that the Supreme Court is open to such an approach. 
A. Theory 
The codification of the class action device in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23 was an “evolutionary response to the existence of injuries unremedied by 
the regulatory action of government.”63 The thinking behind the class action 
is that many claims are simply not worth enough to justify litigating them on 
an individual basis, which will lead over time to underenforcement of many 
laws.64 “Rule 23 responds to th[is] problem[] and, in so doing, pushes the 
substantive law closer to maximal implementation.”65 The substantive law 
most on the mind of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules in drafting Rule 
23 was civil rights: “If there was a single, undoubted goal of the committee, 
the energizing force which motivated the whole rule, it was the firm 
determination to create a class action system which could deal with civil rights 
and, explicitly, segregation.”66 
 
61 Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976); see also U.S. Parole 
Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 413 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“Art. III contains no 
exception for class actions.”). 
62 For an excellent analysis of the standing problem in Floyd, see Katherine Macfarlane, New York 
City’s Stop-and-Frisk Appeals Are Still Alive, J.L. & POL’Y PRACTICUM (Dec. 26, 2013), http://practicum.
brooklaw.edu/articles/new-york-city%E2%80%99s-stop-and-frisk-appeals-are-still-alive [https://perma.cc/
3B3P-GGF4] (explaining that if “Lyons is properly applied, the inevitable outcome is that the [Floyd] 
plaintiffs lack standing” and that because “Lyons is still good law, the way to overcome it was to 
acknowledge that Lyons is binding, and then explain how to overcome its holding with a new theory 
of justiciability” (footnote omitted)). 
63 Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank of Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980). 
64 David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang, 1953–1980, 
90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 593 (2013); see also Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary 
Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 686 (1941) (“If each is left to assert his rights alone if 
and when he can, there will at best be a random and fragmentary enforcement, if there is any at all.”). 
65 Marcus, supra note 64, at 593. 
66 John P. Frank, Response to 1996 Circulation of Proposed Rule 23 on Class Actions, in 2 WORKING 
PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 
CIVIL RULE 23, at 262, 266 (1997), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/WorkingPapers-Vol2pdf [https://
perma.cc/JC7M-7WJY]; see also Marcus, supra note 64, at 608 (noting that Committee members 
“designed Rule 23(b)(2) expressly for [the civil rights] cause”). 
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The upshot of this is that the American class action is not merely a suit 
with many plaintiffs—it is instead a fundamentally different type of suit.67 
By the mid-1970s, just a decade after the “newly-revised Rule 23 . . . went into 
effect” and created the modern class action,68 scholars had recognized as much: 
Whatever the resolution of the current controversies surrounding class 
actions, I think it unlikely that the class action will ever be taught to behave in 
accordance with the precepts of the traditional model of adjudication. The class suit 
is a reflection of our growing awareness that a host of important public and 
private interactions—perhaps the most important in defining the conditions 
and opportunities of life for most people—are conducted on a routine or 
bureaucratized basis and can no longer be visualized as bilateral transactions 
between private individuals.69 
Conceiving of the class action as not your everyday lawsuit is significant 
in several ways,70 but, for present purposes, the question is whether it can 
affect the analysis of threshold requirements such as standing. Judge Diane 
Wood, then a professor, illustrated how this might work by positing the class 
action as a “representational model” under which “one person may represent 
the interests of others who are not before the court” and the “procedural focus 
is upon the named representative(s).”71 This theory places all of the emphasis 
on the named plaintiff: “only he (they) must satisfy the pertinent jurisdictional 
and other preliminary requirements for bringing suit.”72 A contrary view 
deemphasizes the named plaintiff—going so far as to call for the elimination 
of the class representative altogether—on the grounds that the “class 
representative, as the named plaintiff, makes the class action resemble the 
traditional lawsuit,” which is “a mold in which [the class action] will never 
 
67 See, e.g., Jean Wegman Burns, Decorative Figureheads: Eliminating Class Representatives in Class 
Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 165, 179 (1990) (“[T]he class action simply does not function like the 
traditional private-rights lawsuit around which most common law jurisprudence and practice has 
developed.”); Diane Wood Hutchinson, Class Actions: Joinder or Representational Device?, 1983 SUP. 
CT. REV. 459, 479 (“The original policy supporting class actions arose out of the ordinary rigidity 
of the rules governing parties.”). 
68 Marcus, supra note 64, at 588. 
69 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1291 
(1976) (emphases added). 
70 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. 
L.J. 625, 632 (1987) (“[T]he practice has developed that the attorney finds the clients, rather than 
vice versa . . . . [E]ven in these true disaster cases the same individuals can turn up recurrently as 
lead plaintiffs, even where they do not appear to have sustained serious injury.”). 
71 Hutchinson, supra note 67, at 497. 
72 Id. Importantly, even under this theory, “[i]f the district court certifies a class and the named 
member’s claim then becomes moot, one need not consider the entire case dead, because there has 
been judicial recognition that a class exists and its interests are implicated.” Id. at 498 (footnote omitted). 
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fit.”73 Under this view, “[i]nsofar as standing and mootness issues are 
concerned, . . . these issues can be analyzed in class actions by focusing not on 
the named plaintiff but on the class and absent class members.”74 
Underlying this split in views is an inescapable tension between Rule 23 
and Article III.75 Rule 23 simply envisions a different role for the named 
plaintiff than Article III does. “In a class action suit, the function of the 
named plaintiff . . . is to represent the interests of putative class members, 
not to supply the injury needed to satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement 
of [A]rticle III.”76 Rather, in a class action, the class as a whole provides the 
relevant injury.77 For this reason, analyzing standing by narrowly focusing on 
the named plaintiff undermines the class action’s important function in 
shifting such analyses away from the defendant’s effects on a single claimant 
to the defendant’s effects on a sizable and often undifferentiated group of 
individuals.78 Even Judge Wood’s representational model—which on its face 
relies on such a narrow focus—is still based on the idea that, since Rule 23 
incentivizes plaintiffs to bring claims that would not otherwise be brought, 
Article III should allow them to bring such claims.79 
 
73 Burns, supra note 67, at 186-87; see also id. at 179 (suggesting that the insignificance of the 
named plaintiff is recognized in “[c]lass action practice [as opposed to theory],” where “there is a 
general recognition that the named plaintiff is largely a figurehead”). 
74 Id. at 187 (emphasis added); see also id. (urging flexibility on standing in class actions because 
“Article III requires a case or controversy, but does not dictate who must be party to the case or controversy”). 
75 See Jean Wegman Burns, Standing and Mootness in Class Actions: A Search for Consistency, 22 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1239, 1242 n.15 (1989) (“Article III and Rule 23 address two related yet different 
concerns. Article III asks if this plaintiff has a ‘case or controversy’ with this defendant. Put bluntly, 
has what this defendant done injured this plaintiff? Rule 23, on the other hand, asks: Is this plaintiff 
a proper representative of the class?”). 
76 Richard K. Greenstein, Bridging the Mootness Gap in Federal Court Class Actions, 35 STAN. L. 
REV. 897, 925 (1983); see also Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1917 (2007) (arguing that, if Lyons had been a class action, because the 
plaintiff ’s “presence in court seeking injunctive relief was a fortuitous consequence of his past 
injury[, i]t is unclear why he [w]ould be authorized, or even trusted, to represent the interests of an 
unnamed and unknowable class of other potential victims”). 
77 See Burns, supra note 67, at 167 (“All standing and mootness issues [should] be decided by 
reference to the status of the class’s claim, not the status of one individual’s claim.”). 
78 See Matthew R. Ford, Adequacy and the Public Rights Model of the Class Action After Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 5 (2008) (“[T]he class mechanism provides a means to 
challenge policies that, while not affecting the named plaintiff personally, affect a larger segment of 
the population—specifically, the class.”); Hutchinson, supra note 67, at 505 (criticizing “a joinder 
approach to class actions” that “treat[s] every individual member of the class just as it would have if 
the class device were not being used”); Marcus, supra note 64, at 593 (“Courts should train their 
attention instead on the defendant’s conduct toward the aggregate, for this is what needs regulating.”). 
79 See Hutchinson, supra note 67, at 472 (“The basic controversy remains whether the proper 
goal for the class action should be limited to the minimum one of providing a shortcut to otherwise 
multitudinous litigation, or on the other hand, should be extended to the maximum one of opening 
court access to otherwise nonlitigable claims.” (quoting 3B MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.03[1], 
at 23-42 (1982))). 
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The representational model’s relaxed approach to standing holds the named 
plaintiff to traditional standing requirements while exempting unnamed class 
members from them altogether.80 But the relaxing could be done quite differently. 
An “aggregate standing” model in class actions would relax the normal Article 
III prerequisites on all parties by instead asking whether the class as a whole has 
standing.81 This model would have several benefits. It would coincide with 
the idea that a “class action is not an application of rights, duties, and remedies 
to an individual case brought by a particular person”82 but instead exists to 
“permit[] the affected group to . . . aggregate (and to some extent average) their 
individual circumstances and interests in seeking relief.”83 It would refocus 
attention away from the interests of the relatively insignificant class representative 
to the interests of the class as a whole.84 And it would recognize that, despite 
their differences, Rule 23 and Article III have sufficiently similar goals such that 
where plaintiffs satisfy Rule 23’s requirements, Article III should not independently 
bar litigation.85 
Finally, and relevantly in the context of Floyd, an aggregate standing model 
would particularly benefit Rule 23(b)(2), or “public interest,” class actions.86 
This type of class action is most at odds with traditional standing doctrine’s 
commitment to individualism, because it provides indivisible, class-wide 
injunctive relief.87 Because Rule 23(b)(2) class actions are “a needed means of 
obtaining redress for very real societal wrongs,”88 a restrictive approach to 
standing that leads to countless situations in which “a right exists without an 
equitable remedy”89 undermines the very point of the class action. In contrast, 
an aggregate standing approach, by recognizing that the named plaintiff in a 
 
80 Hutchinson, supra note 67, at 478. 
81 For a distinct but related idea, see Sergio J. Campos, Class Actions and Justiciability, 66 FLA. 
L. REV. 553, 598 (2014) (“[T]he law of justiciability permits the standing of uninjured, even unharmed, 
plaintiffs [in class actions] . . . if doing so is necessary to adequately protect the interests of those injured.”). 
82 Burns, supra note 67, at 180 (emphases added). 
83 Id. (emphases added). 
84 See id. at 190-92 (criticizing standing approaches that focus on the named plaintiff because they do 
“nothing to answer the real question: Is there a concrete, class-wide claim that the class wants decided?”). 
85 See Campos, supra note 81, at 600 (“[A]dequacy of representation is the guiding principle of 
Article III’s justiciability requirements.”); Ford, supra note 78, at 15 (“Many commentators advocate 
a relaxed notion of standing [in class actions] based on a belief that the class itself has an independent 
legal significance that justifies departing from the private rights model.”); David Marcus, The Public 
Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. 177, 818 (2016) (“Properly applied, class action procedure neutralizes 
the right plaintiff principle’s effect in public law litigation.”). 
86 These class actions seek structural reform through injunctive relief. See Marcus, supra note 85, at 780-81. 
87 See id. at 808-10. 
88 C. Douglas Floyd, Civil Rights Class Actions in the 1980’s: The Burger Court’s Pragmatic Approach 
to Problems of Adequate Representation and Justiciability, 1984 BYU L. REV. 1, 32. 
89 Fisher, supra note 46, at 1115; see also id. at 1115-16 (“Such a result can be unjust, particularly 
because the presence of [a] plaintiff class normally would increase the likelihood of recurrence [of 
injury] to at least some class members.”). 
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class action “can attack more than what the defendant specifically directs 
toward her,”90 will ensure that more public interest class actions get past 
threshold justiciability matters and closer to realizing Rule 23’s original 
purpose of aiding public law enforcement efforts.91 
B. Precedent 
What would an “aggregate standing” approach in class actions look like in 
practice? Helpfully, the Supreme Court has opened the door for such an 
approach. While the Court’s first treatments of justiciability in class actions 
relied on a traditional, restrictive approach,92 the Court was at the same time 
experimenting with a “different, more flexible, and functionally oriented 
approach to the Article III case-or-controversy requirement in class actions.”93 
An early example of this new leaf was Sosna v. Iowa, in which a newly minted 
Iowa resident (Sosna) brought a class action alleging that Iowa’s one-year 
residency requirement for initiating divorce proceedings was unconstitutional.94 
The district court certified the class and upheld the Iowa law.95 Unsurprisingly, 
however, Sosna had lived in Iowa for more than a year by the time the case 
reached the Supreme Court, and so, under traditional principles, her particular 
case was moot.96 
The Court nevertheless found that, for the class as a whole, the case was 
not moot.97 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, emphasized class certification: 
When the District Court certified . . . the class action, the class of unnamed 
persons described in the certification acquired a legal status separate from the 
interest asserted by appellant . . . . [E]ven though appellees in this proceeding 
might not again enforce the Iowa durational residency requirement against 
 
90 Marcus, supra note 85, at 820. 
91 See Marcus, supra note 64, at 590 (“[C]ivil rights practitioners . . . argued for what I call the 
‘regulatory conception’ of Rule 23.”). 
92 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975) (“[A] plaintiff . . . must allege specific, 
concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harm him, and that he personally would 
benefit in a tangible way from the court’s intervention.” (second emphasis added)); O’Shea v. Littleton, 
414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (“[I]f none of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class establishes 
the requisite of a case or controversy with the defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himself 
or any other member of the class.”). 
93 Burns, supra note 75, at 1247-48. 
94 419 U.S. 393, 395 (1975). 
95 Id. at 397-98. 
96 Id. at 398-99. 
97 Id. at 402. The Court decided 8–1 on the mootness issue, with only Justice White dissenting. 
Id. at 410-18 (White, J., dissenting). 
1522 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 164: 1509 
appellant, it is clear that they will enforce it against those persons in the class 
that appellant sought to represent and that the District Court certified.98 
As a result, Rehnquist wrote, “Although the controversy is no longer live 
as to appellant Sosna, it remains very much alive for the class of persons she 
has been certified to represent.”99 Before proceeding to the merits, however, 
Rehnquist attempted to ward off expansive interpretations of Sosna by 
reemphasizing certification: 
There must . . . be a named plaintiff who has [a live] case or controversy at 
the time the complaint is filed[] and at the time the class action is certified 
. . . . [Post-certification, t]he controversy may exist, however, between a 
named defendant and a member of the class represented by the named 
plaintiff, even though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot.100 
Despite this limiting language, it was clear that “the Sosna approach 
diluted the importance of the class representative.”101 But this was just the 
beginning. A month later, in Gerstein v. Pugh, the Court appeared merely to 
apply Sosna to different facts but actually took this flexible approach to 
justiciability a step further.102 Gerstein was a class action by prisoners held in 
pretrial custody who claimed “a constitutional right to a judicial hearing on 
the issue of probable cause.”103 By the time the case reached the Court, the 
named plaintiffs’ cases were moot since they had been convicted and were no 
longer in pretrial custody.104 Addressing mootness in a footnote, the Court 
acknowledged that it was not clear whether any of the named plaintiffs were 
in custody when the class was certified, which Sosna required in order to avoid 
mootness.105 Yet, the Court held that Gerstein was “a suitable exception to that 
requirement” because “it [was] by no means certain that any given individual 
. . . would be in pretrial custody long enough for a district judge to certify 
the class” and “in this case the constant existence of a class of persons suffering the 
deprivation [was] certain.”106 
This shows that the Gerstein Court did not merely apply Sosna’s relaxed 
mootness approach to a class action involving claims that were “capable of 
 
98 Id. at 399-400. 
99 Id. at 401. 
100 Id. at 402. 
101 Burns, supra note 75, at 1250. 
102 420 U.S. 103 (1975). 
103 Id. at 107. 
104 Id. at 111 n.11. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. (emphasis added). 
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repetition, yet evading review.”107 Instead, the Court went beyond the Sosna 
approach and openly acknowledged that injuries suffered by unnamed class 
members could be used in assessing whether the named plaintiffs’ claims were 
justiciable.108 And a year later, in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., a class 
action suit on behalf of black truck drivers concerning retroactive seniority 
relief under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Court went further still.109 
Addressing mootness because one of the named plaintiffs had since been fired 
for cause, the Franks Court first noted that the class had been certified.110 But 
the Court went on to say that because mootness doctrine merely serves to 
ensure that a true “adversary relationship” exists when the Court hears a case, 
the fact that the “unnamed members of the class involved [were] identifiable 
individuals” and “[n]o questions [were] raised concerning the continuing 
desire of any of these class members for the seniority relief ” meant that the 
doctrine’s purpose was met and the case was not moot.111 
Importantly, the Court soon thereafter indicated that even Franks’s 
perfunctory attention to class certification was something of a red herring. In 
two cases decided on the same day in 1980, the Court addressed the question 
whether a class representative whose claims had been mooted had standing to 
appeal a denial of his motion for class certification.112 In Roper, where the 
putative class representatives were credit card holders who had sued their 
bank alleging unlawfully high charges, the Court answered yes, on the grounds 
that the named plaintiffs had “a continuing individual interest in the resolution 
of the class certification question in their desire to shift part of the costs of 
litigation to those who will share in its benefits if the class is certified and 
ultimately prevails.”113 But in Geraghty, a suit brought to enjoin federal parole 
release guidelines in which the putative class representative had been released 
from prison by the time the case was heard,114 the Court “concluded that such 
 
107 Id. at 110 n.11. The claims were at least more capable of evading review than the claims in 
Sosna. The pretrial custody claims in Gerstein usually were not “live” for more than a month because 
Florida law provided for a probable cause hearing after thirty days, while the claims in Sosna could 
be live for a full year. 
108 See Burns, supra note 75, at 1255 (“[I]n Gerstein, the Court, for the first time, was openly 
willing to assume the existence of an ongoing ‘class’ of persons with an interest in the controversy, 
even before certification.”). 
109 424 U.S. 747 (1976). 
110 Id. at 755. 
111 Id. at 755-56. 
112 U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980); Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank of Jackson, 
Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980). 
113 Roper, 445 U.S. at 336. The Court’s analysis also pointed out that a class action was not 
simply traditional litigation writ large, but served important independent purposes. See id. at 338 
(“The use of the class-action procedure for litigation of individual claims may offer substantial 
advantages for named plaintiffs . . . .”). 
114 Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 394. 
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[a Roper-like] economic interest was unnecessary.”115 Unlike his counterparts 
in Roper, the Geraghty representative had conceded that he could “obtain 
absolutely no additional personal relief ” if the class were certified.116 The 
Court nevertheless found that he had standing to appeal the denial, reasoning 
that “the right to represent a class” was “more analogous to the private attorney 
general concept than to the type of interest traditionally thought to satisfy 
the ‘personal stake’ requirement.”117 
Once again, the Court sought to narrow its holdings,118 but by the time Geraghty 
and Roper were decided, the seeds of Sosna had grown into a flexible-approach 
forest that would prove difficult to chop down. Even after Lujan and the rise 
of restrictive standing doctrine, the Court has not tried to do so. 
Indeed, the flexible approach is alive and well. In Gratz v. Bollinger, rejected 
applicants to the University of Michigan (UM) brought a class action alleging 
that UM’s affirmative action policy in freshman admissions was unconstitutional 
and seeking injunctive relief.119 The Court agreed and struck the policy down.120 
The Court addressed standing as a threshold matter, however, because the 
named plaintiffs had since attended different colleges and seemingly had no 
stake in whether or not UM’s affirmative action policy was enjoined.121 
Unsurprisingly, the Gratz Court found no standing problem,122 but it did 
so through a clever use of the flexible approach that claimed to tread no new 
ground but appears to have set aside justiciability concerns entirely in cases 
where Rule 23 is satisfied. Focusing on the plaintiff who maintained an ongoing 
intention to apply to UM as a transfer student if its affirmative action policy 
were struck down, the Court reasoned that—although UM’s policy in freshman 
admissions was distinct from its policy in transfer admissions, and only the 
freshman policy was before the Court123—the policies were similar enough to 
allow a plaintiff whose live claim was the result of one policy (the transfer) to 
 
115 Campos, supra note 81, at 563. 
116 Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 420 n.14 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
117 Id. at 402-03. 
118 See, e.g., id. at 404 (“Our holding is limited to the appeal of the denial of the class 
certification motion.”). 
119 539 U.S. 244, 252 (2003). 
120 Id. at 275. 
121 Id. at 260. The parties did not raise the issue, but Justice Stevens devoted his entire dissent 
to arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Id. at 282-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
122 See David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted Remedies, 
2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1238 (“[T]he Court’s willingness to [find standing in Gratz and] intervene 
on the merits may well have turned on the political dimension of the substantive rights at stake.”). 
123 Only the freshman policy was the subject of the Court’s ultimate holding. See Gratz, 539 
U.S. at 275 (“We conclude, therefore, that because the University’s use of race in its current freshman 
admissions policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve respondents’ asserted compelling interest in 
diversity, the admissions policy violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 
(emphasis added)). 
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represent a class suing to invalidate another policy (the freshman).124 Gratz 
thus helpfully encapsulates the modern Court’s views on justiciability. Not 
only did it show that justiciability analysis often turns on whether or not the 
Court wants to take the case on the merits, but also it made clear that the 
Court has now fully departed from its old view that standing analysis should 
not differ for class actions. “[I]t is undeniable that . . . the [Gratz] representative 
. . . was able to enjoin a policy that he would not have had standing to enjoin 
outside of the class-action context . . . .”125 
III. STANDING IN FLOYD 
Floyd provides an excellent opportunity to see how a post-Gratz flexible 
approach to standing in class actions would work in practice. Indeed, the Floyd 
court found that the plaintiffs had standing using this approach, although it 
did not say so—the court claimed to find standing by simply applying Lyons 
in a routine manner. But something else was at work in the court’s analysis. 
This Part attempts to unwrap this judicial sleight-of-hand and explain what 
the court was actually saying. 
A. What the Court Said 
In Floyd, recall that the four named plaintiffs brought a class action suit 
against the City of New York to enjoin the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program, 
alleging that searches made under the program violated the Fourth Amendment’s 
reasonable suspicion requirement and unfairly targeted racial minorities in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.126 In opposing class certification, the 
City argued that three of the four named plaintiffs lacked standing, to which 
the court responded “by noting that David Ourlicht, the fourth plaintiff, 
indisputably does have standing and that ‘the presence of one party with 
standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.’”127 
In its three-pronged analysis, the court directly addressed Lyons. First, the 
court noted that since Ourlicht had not only been stopped three times prior 
to initiating the suit, but also once since, the possibility of a future stop was 
not speculative.128 Second, because such stops were not predicated on valid 
arrests—unlike the chokeholds at issue in Lyons—Ourlicht could not avoid 
them simply by abstaining from unlawful conduct.129 Finally, the court found 
 
124 Id. at 263-67. 
125 Ford, supra note 78, at 21. 
126 Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial ¶¶ 1, 3, 6, Floyd I, 283 F.R.D. 153 (No. 08-01304), ECF No. 1. 
127 Floyd I, 283 F.R.D. at 169 (citation omitted). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 169-70. 
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that “the frequency of alleged injuries inflicted by the practices at issue here create[d] 
a likelihood of future injury sufficient to address any standing concerns.”130 
On this final point, the court distinguished Lyons because there “the police 
department’s challenged policies were responsible for [only] ten deaths,” 
whereas in Floyd, the New York City “police department ha[d] conducted over 
2.8 million stops over six years.”131 Such “widespread practices” made Ourlicht’s 
“risk of future injury . . . ‘real and immediate,’ not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”132 
B. What the Court Actually Meant 
Beneath that surface-level reasoning, the court was actually saying that a 
class action is not normal litigation, and normal rules—e.g., Lyons—do not 
strictly apply.133 Because Ourlicht is suing on behalf of a class and Rule 23’s 
requirements are otherwise satisfied,134 there is no need for him to be held to 
the same “real and immediate” threat of future harm standard that Lyons was 
held to in order to have standing. It simply should not matter, let alone be 
dispositive, whether Ourlicht’s chances of being stopped again are properly 
described as “likely,” “probably,” or “certainly,” because it is certain that other 
New Yorkers will be stopped and that the types of claims those stops create 
will be virtually the same as Ourlicht’s. The class representative is just that: 
a representative. Forcing Ourlicht to individually satisfy the narrow injury in 
fact, causation, and redressability requirements that the Supreme Court not 
only created but has interpreted in unnecessarily restrictive ways ignores the 
fact that he is representing others not before the court. 
For purposes of standing, the Floyd court implicitly said that the class is 
important, but the representative is not. The plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 
23(a)’s numerosity, commonality, representativeness, and adequacy requirements 
and have shown, pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), that the City’s stop-and-frisk 
policies “apply generally to the class.”135 A large number of class members will 
certainly suffer the alleged harm in the near future. This is sufficient for the 
case to move forward. A restricted notion of justiciability created for traditional 
lawsuits should not be an independent hurdle for the plaintiffs to overcome. 
Finally, the court implicitly acknowledged that the Supreme Court does 
not seem to have a problem with a relaxed approach that focuses on the class 
and Rule 23’s requirements rather than on the named plaintiff and the Lyons 
 
130 Id. at 170 (emphasis added). 
131 Id. 
132 Id. (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)). 
133 Indeed, in Lyons’s immediate wake, some courts openly said as much. See, e.g., Lewis v. 
Tully, 99 F.R.D. 632, 638 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (“This case differs significantly from Lyons, however, in 
that there is no indication . . . in Lyons that the case had been certified as a class action.”). 
134 The court addressed Rule 23 standards immediately after standing. Floyd I, 283 F.R.D. at 170-78. 
135 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
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standard. The Court has indicated as much not only directly, by chipping 
away at justiciability requirements in Sosna and seemingly discarding them 
entirely in Gratz, but also indirectly, by analyzing standing in results-oriented 
ways even in its nonclass decisions. In Lujan, for example, the Court faced 
the problem that the plaintiffs had indeed been injured “in fact,” because they 
claimed that the federal government’s failure to apply certain endangered 
species laws outside of the United States threatened their ability to travel and 
observe those species.136 This “diminished opportunity” to see the species was 
undeniably a factual injury.137 But the Court instead focused on the binary 
question of whether the plaintiffs would actually see the animals or not, and 
because the plaintiffs had made no specific travel plans to do so, any claimed 
injury from the government’s failure to enforce the endangered species laws 
was deemed speculative.138 By contrast, in the affirmative action case Regents 
of University of California v. Bakke, where injury in fact was questionable 
because it was not clear that the white plaintiff would have been admitted to 
the U.C. Davis Medical School even absent affirmative action, the Court flexibly 
interpreted the relevant injury as the plaintiff ’s inability to compete for 
admission on a fair playing field—regardless of his actual chances at admission.139 
What Lujan and Bakke show is that even outside the class context, the 
Supreme Court frequently adopts an “ends justify the means” approach to 
justiciability that belies Article III’s purported strictness. In Floyd, there is a 
certifiable class and a guarantee of immediate future injury to its members. 
Individually, Ourlicht probably does not satisfy Lyons—but so what? 
CONCLUSION 
The rationale behind Rule 23 justifies a relaxed approach to standing in 
class actions, and the Supreme Court has embraced this model in past cases. 
Floyd is a case where the traditional approach would have gotten the wrong 
result, and where the court, sensing this, implicitly used a relaxed approach 
and treated the relevant injured party as the class rather than the named 
plaintiff. While tricky issues remain—such as how a denial of class certification 
should affect standing analysis—courts should feel able to begin these standing 
inquiries by noting that class actions are different from traditional litigation, 
and proceeding from there. 
 
136 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992). 
137 Sunstein, supra note 28, at 204. 
138 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564. 
139 438 U.S. 265, 280 n.14 (1978). 
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